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In this thesis, I discuss the problem of truth and attempt to give an account of 
what truth is.  
Chapter One states the problem of truth from the perspectives of the robust and 
deflationary theories of truth. The robust approach is provisionally rejected as a theory of 
last resort. It would be ideal from the standpoint of simplicity if a deflationary theory 
could be made to work. This is because deflationism sees the concept of truth and the 
word “true” as serving some purpose other than that of designating a property or a kind of 
thing. It does not have to countenance true and false entities, “truths” and “falsehoods”. 
Only if the deflationary approach proves untenable should we bother to consider robust 
theories, which do posit such things. 
Chapter Two begins with an overview of the deflationist agenda and its 
motivation. Two desiderata for all ideal deflationary theories of truth are subsequently 
put forth. An ideal deflationary theory should respect the equivalence of all instances of 
the truth schema, and it should not trade a commitment to robust truth for something 
equally undesirable, for example, robust propositions. Quine’s Disquotational theory of 
truth is examined and demonstrated to have failed to satisfy the first desideratum because 
of the way he makes truth hinge on language.  
Horwich’s Minimal theory of truth is examined in Chapter Three. Its similarities 
to and differences from Quine’s theory are noted. Horwich’s theory does not satisfy the 
second desideratum, because he appeals to propositions understood as truth bearers. 
Apart from the fact that propositions are questionable entities, this vitiates the 
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deflationary project by introducing entities that might themselves be eliminated in favour 
of truth. Propositions arguably are just such entities. We can replace propositions with 
sets of collections of sentences, each comprising all the sentences that can be true at the 
same time as a given sentence, as easily as we can replace truth-talk with generalisations 
about propositions. 
In Chapter Four, I attempt to give an alternative deflationary account of truth 
and argue that the truth predicate is a device for the undertaking of certain cognitive and 
conversational commitments. When we use the truth predicate, we undertake certain 
commitments like that of maintaining our assertion and defending it if challenged. I begin 
with a discussion of the simplest case, where one simply asserts that something is true. I 
then provide examples of the other uses of truth, especially the generalising uses in which 
truth occurs in existential and universal claims. This is where most deflationary accounts 
falter.  
I conclude my discussion of truth by arguing in Chapter Five that the 
undertaking of certain commitments fully accounts for our concept of truth, and that it is 
here where truth finds its role in language. The undertaking of these commitments is prior 
to truth in that the truth predicate is a device for undertaking them; it is not that truth is or 
means this sort of undertaking of commitments. The chapter ends with an application of 
this account to truth’s other generalising uses in conditionals and with ascriptions of 
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  In this thesis, I defend a deflationary position on the problem of truth. I will begin 
by stating the problem of truth, which requires an explication of the distinction between 
robust and deflationary conceptions of truth. Thereafter, I will proceed with my defence 
of deflationism as the correct theory of truth.  
The Problem of Truth 
 The problem of truth can be understood in terms of the following questions. Is 
truth a property? If it is, then what kind of a property is it? If it is not, then what does the 
notion of truth do (in language and thought)? A robust theory of truth is one that takes 
truth to be a genuine property possessed by certain things, the bearers of truth-values. It 
therefore attempts to explicate the nature of truth as a property, usually a relational 
property that truth bearers possessed by virtue of appropriately corresponding to certain 
conditions, those that make them true (or as the case may be, false). A deflationary theory 
of truth, on the other hand, does not suppose that truth is such a property. On this view, 
truth is “deflated” of all metaphysical content. Deflationism sees the word “true” as doing 
something in language, having some specific linguistic function, distinct from that of 
representing a property, as the word “hot” represents the property of heat. According to 
this view, the word “true” does not function like an ordinary property-word, and the 
concept of truth does not function like an ordinary property-concept. In short, the 
predicate “true” and its conceptual analogue (the concept of truth) do not function 
primarily (or, at all) as property-representations. Deflationism says that we use “true” and 
related terms only in ways that do not primarily include predicating a property. Note that 
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a theory of truth can still count as deflationist, even if it allows that in some cases, “true” 
stands for a property as long as this property is something philosophically banal. For 
example, a deflationist can allow that there is a use of “true” to ascribe to sentences the 
property of saying something true. This is fine as long as she goes on to deflate the notion 
of saying something true, construing truth-saying talk otherwise than as attributing to 
speakers the production of entities with the properties of truth and falsity 1 All the 
deflationist say is that, unlike predicates like “is red”, the grammatically similar truth 
predicate is not primarily used to attribute properties.  
Kirkham rightly points out “there is little agreement about what the philosophical 
problem of truth is” (Kirkham, 1995:1); there are different ways in which the problem 
can be characterised. The problem of truth is best understood in terms of the attempts to 
solve it. Kirkham characterises the attempts as different projects, namely, the 
metaphysical, the justification and the speech-act projects. Each attempt falls under at 
least one of these projects. I prefer to characterise the attempts in terms of the distinction 
between the robust and the deflationary positions on truth. Under Kirkham’s 
categorisation, robust theories usually fall under the metaphysics project, which seeks to 
discover the nature or the essence of truth. Deflationary theories usually fall under the 
speech-act project of truth. Speech-acts are “doings”; the concern is in describing what is 
being done when we ascribe truth. Instead of dealing with questions like what kind of a 
property truth is, what is the relationship between truth and the bearers of truth, 
deflationary theories tackle the role of the truth predicate, and what we are doing when 
                                                 
1 As Horwich points out, if we take a liberal conception of property, such that every term that functions 
logically as a predicate stands for a property, then truth may count as a property. But this certainly is a very 
weak conception of property, and deflationism (or minimalism for Horwich) surely can concede this. 
(Horwich, 1998:141-142) 
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we say that something is true. In short, robust theories are concerned with the nature of 
truth as a property, while deflationary theories focus on the “doing” of truth-talk.  
Why Deflationism? 
Having made the distinction between robust and deflationary conceptions of truth, 
I now proceed to argue that any attempt to solve the problem of truth must begin with 
considering a deflationary position on truth. The starting point of robust theories of truth 
is the assumption that truth is a property. It is that property which we ascribe to 
something when we say it is true. Robust theories differ from one another in what they 
take to be the central use of the truth predicate, whether to designate a property that 
certain sentences have by virtue of how they relate to the physical world, a non-physical 
property of objective non-physical propositions, or something else. Many robust theories 
allow, like deflationism, that in addition to its central use, the truth predicate has 
secondary or derivative uses. For example, someone who holds that truth is primarily a 
property of abstract propositions may allow that a sentence that expresses such 
propositions can be called true, is a derived sense of the word. The important point that 
robust theories have in common is that they assume that the predicate “true” and the 
concept of truth primarily serve as representation of a property, where the instantiation of 
the property is ultimately what makes something true.  
However, given the very option of a deflationist position on this matter, it does 
not seem justified to assume that truth is a property in the robust sense. If truth can be 
given a deflationist analysis, then it cannot be taken for granted that truth is a property. 
There is not yet agreement on whether truth is a property. Therefore to assert that truth is 
a property demands defence.  
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The mere fact that the truth predicate is a predicate does not entail that its main 
function is to represent a property like most other predicates. Take the case of “sake” as it 
occurs in language, for example, “I did it for John’s sake”. At face value, “sake” appears 
to function like an ordinary noun, like “hat”, as in “This is John’s hat”. But to assume that 
“sake” functions like an ordinary noun is a mistake; its linguistic role is not to stand for 
some object. “Sake” does not represent something that John possesses in the way he 
possesses a hat. We cannot analyse “sake” in the same way as we analyse “hat”. It just 
does not make sense to treat “sake” like an ordinary noun until “given good reasons to 
think otherwise” simply because of its surface grammar. A criterion of what it is to be a 
“sake” cannot be given like that for “hat”. The analysis for “sake” is different from that 
of ordinary nouns. Of course, it is possible that “sake” might turn out to be an ordinary 
noun, but not only is this unlikely, we really do not need sakes in our ontology.  
This is not to say that the burden of proof lies with the robust side of every 
question. A robust account of the predicate “round”, according to which it primarily 
represents a property, is a reasonable place to start. But the word “true” has sake-like 
qualities; one of the first things we notice about it is that it is basically inessential to the 
meaning of statements like, “It is true that the sky is blue”. This is enough to warrant 
looking into a deflationist theory before getting involved in the complications of the 
robust approach. 
Deflationism is worth defending for its simplicity. In particular, deflationism 
implies that there is no need to figure out what the bearers of truth are, and more 
importantly, which property the property of being true is. It is parsimonious to give truth 
a deflationary analysis, since we will not need to postulate an additional entity, namely, 
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the property of truth. If we can give a complete account of truth without presupposing 
that it is a property, then we need not add any unusual or controversial properties to our 
ontology.  
Kirkham believes otherwise; according to him, the virtue of parsimony does not 
favour a deflationary analysis of truth. He claims that for the deflationary thesis to work, 
it needs an extra premise, which is often left implicit by deflationists. This premise is the 
following principle of philosophical method: “one ought postulate all and only such 
entities as one needs to postulate in order to explain the various syntactic and semantic 
features of our language”. In other words, “we ought believe in the existence of a given 
entity if and only if not so believing would leave us unable to make sense of one or 
another of the many kinds of utterances we make”. (ibid., 311) He says that this principle 
is false, and argues that  
we want to explain a lot more than just linguistic phenomena … We want to 
explain all manner of natural and philosophical phenomena as well … we would 
need more than just a showing that our use of ‘is true’ does not require that we 
postulate a property of truth. We would need to show that there is nothing we 
cannot explain without postulating such a property … given the present 
undeveloped state of semantics, that right now it is rational for us to believe the 
contradiction that most predicates are not genuine predicates. Since, by definition, 
most predicates are genuine, the proper principle is that we ought to assume a 
predicate is genuine unless given good reason to think otherwise. (ibid., 330-331)  
Kirkham raises an objection here that the burden of proof is on the deflationist to 
show that “true” is not an ordinary (robust property representing) predicate. Kirkham’s 
argument is that since predicates are robust, odds are that “true” is robust. However, even 
if most predicates are robust, still, we have ample evidence that “true” is a very peculiar 
predicate that behaves differently from ordinary robust predicates. The peculiarities of the 
truth predicate invalidate Kirkham’s inference to the conclusion that “true” is probably an 
ordinary, robust predicate. Suppose Kirkham argues that since most compounds are 
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denser in their solid form, H2O is probably denser in its solid form. Given that we know 
that ice floats in liquid water, however, this argument is not very compelling. Neither is 
Kirkham’s argument that truth is probably a robust predicate. 
In addition, Kirkham’s argument is aimed at a straw man; nobody thinks that the 
only facts to be explained are linguistic facts. All the deflationist is saying is that 
predicates are divisible into two categories: those whose usage we can explain without 
taking them primarily to represent properties, and those whose usage we can explain only 
by taking them to primarily represent properties. The deflationist can happily agree that 
many or most predicates require explanation that involves robust properties, as well as 
that most non-linguistic phenomena require non-linguistic explanations, without being 
forced to relinquish his claim that if you can explain a predicate’s use in a way that does 
not call on robust properties, then you should. To revert to the example we used earlier, if 
we started working on a “robust theory of sakes”, we would end up spending? and, as it 
turns out, wasting? lots of time looking into the ontological status of “sakes”.  
If “sake” can be deflated and divested of an ontologically robust status for good 
reasons, why not “true”? If truth can be given an analysis similar to a deflationary 
analysis of “sake”, without any loss, then we are saved the laborious task of speculating 
about its supposed nature as a property. To try to analyse it in robust terms would then be 
to no purpose, since there would not be a property of truth at all. We are permitted to 
analyse concepts in a deflationary manner so long as it serves the purpose and is a good 
analysis, and if we succeed, we need not take there to be any “natural and philosophical 
phenomena” to explain. Parsimony, contrary to what Kirkham argues, counts as a merit 
of deflationism.  
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A further reason not to begin with a robust approach: The Correspondence Theory 
Frege makes a fundamental attack on the correspondence theory’s definition of 
truth, focusing on its aim to state the conditions for truth. In the attempt to state the 
conditions for truth, the correspondence theory defines truth thus: ‘it is true that p if and 
only if the statement that p corresponds to reality’. Frege’s argument against this 
definition is that it really amounts to saying that ‘it is true that p if and only if it is true 
that the statement that p corresponds to reality’. According to Frege, this means that we 
are never able to specify the conditions under which something corresponds to reality 
except by tacitly calling on the notion of truth. Upon every specification, we can always 
ask if it is true that something satisfies such and such conditions for correspondence to 
reality. So the definition is really circular; the word ‘true’ appears in the definition of 
truth. Hence the correspondence theory is not an acceptable theory of truth.  
One possible reply to Frege’s argument is that the circularity involved is 
harmless. The occurrence of the second ‘it is true’ in the definition adds nothing to the 
heart of the definition, which really lies in ‘corresponds to reality’. So, we should not 
fault the definition on such grounds, for the circularity is not vicious. It is similar to the 
case where if we define ‘father’ as ‘x is a father if and only if x is a father or not a father, 
and is both a male and a parent’. No more need the definition “It is true that p if and only 
if the statement that p corresponds to reality” be useless or vicious, provided that we can 
cash out “correspondence to reality” in truthless terms.   
This reply however misses Frege’s point, which is that unless we can already 
grasp the notion of truth, we cannot evaluate any definition of anything (including truth). 
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This is because for Frege, to grasp the concept of truth is no more or less than to think or 
speak logically, i.e., in accordance with logical laws like the law of non-contradiction.  
the laws of logic are nothing other than an unfolding of the content of the word 
‘true’. Anyone who has failed to grasp the meaning of this word … cannot attain to 
any clear idea of what the task of logic is”. (Frege, 1979:3)  
But in order to evaluate a definition of truth we must be able to reason according to such 
laws. Therefore we cannot even begin to consider whether any given definition of truth is 
adequate unless we already grasp the notion of truth.  
it would be futile to employ a definition in order to make it clearer what is to be 
understood by ‘true’ … any definition of the form ‘A is true if and only if it has 
such-and-such properties or stands in such-and-such relation to such-and-such a 
thing’ … would always come back to the question whether it is true that A has 
such-and-such properties or stands in such-and-such a relation to such-and-such a 
thing. (Ibid., 1897:140) 
However, this reply on Frege’s part in effect presupposes a deflationary account 
of truth. For if we could, as Frege seems to think, equate possessing the concept of truth 
with having the ability to reason logically, that would obviate the need to analyse the 
concept of truth as if it corresponded to a property, in the way that ordinary property 
words do so. Therefore, we can conclude that Frege’s objection to the robust approach is 
essentially the same as what I have argued earlier, that it merits our serious attention only 
if a deflationary account is unavailable.  
Conclusion 
From the above discussion, it follows that the discourse on truth calls for a 
different kind of definition for truth, namely, to define truth as explaining its linguistic 
role, which does not require the postulation of truth as a property, the specification of the 
conditions for truth, and the means to determine the satisfaction of these conditions. From 
my discussion in this chapter, it is evident that robust theories are not entitled to assume 
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that truth is a property. Given the notorious difficulties with treating truth this way, and 
the economical character of the deflationist approach, I choose the deflationist route to 
understand truth. I will examine deflationism in greater detail in the following two 




Quine’s Disquotational Theory of Truth 
 
By directing the debate on truth away from robust theories in the first chapter of 
this thesis, I have argued for starting with a deflationary approach in understanding truth. 
I will further examine deflationism in this chapter, beginning with the overall deflationist 
agenda, and then moving on to examine a prominent deflationary theory, namely, 
Quine’s Disquotational theory, and the problems it faces. In Chapter Three, I continue 
with an examination of Horwich’s Minimal theory, another deflationist attempt at 
understanding truth, before summing up the difficulties deflationism faces in general at 
the end of that chapter.  
A brief overview of Deflationism 
 The deflationist agenda is to provide an account of truth that does not require the 
postulation of truth as a property. A deflationary theory of truth does not regard truth as a 
property in any metaphysically interesting (robust) sense. Instead of inquiring into the 
nature of truth, emphasis is placed on the linguistic or formal role of the truth predicate. 
The deflationist thesis holds that there is nothing more to the concept of truth than the 
linguistic role of the truth predicate, that is, a comprehensive account of the truth 
predicate explains everything we need to know to understand truth.  
Ideally, there are two desiderata to be fulfilled for any deflationary theory of truth. 
Firstly, the theory should respect the equivalence of all instances of the truth schema: p is 
true if and only if p; it must provide a correct analysis of the truth predicate. And 
secondly, the theory should not trade a commitment to robust truth for something equally 
undesirable, such as robust propositions. Although one might say that if we have to 
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inflate on propositions in order for a deflationary truth, the trade-off might not be that 
undesirable after all, for we have at least deflated on truth. Perhaps so, but if deflationary 
theories are so insistent that truth should not be a robust property, then to maintain such 
an outlook, ideally, it should avoid inflating on entities like propositions. These 
desiderata are for an ideal deflationary theory, not requirements that necessarily have to 
be fulfilled to achieve a correct deflationary theory of truth. Nonetheless, any deflationary 
attempt should ideally aim to fulfil these two desiderata, not just either one of them. More 
details of these desiderata will be given as I proceed to examine if Quine’s disquotational 
theory and Horwich’s minimal theory satisfy the two desiderata in the remaining of this 
chapter and in the next respectively.  
Quine’s Disquotational Theory 
In Philosophy of Logic, Quine begins by expressing his dislike of propositions. He 
claims that philosophers who are sympathetic to propositions believe that “propositions 
are needed because truth is intelligible only of propositions, not of sentences … (and) that 
truth should hinge on reality, not language; sentences are language”. (Ibid., 144) Quine 
agrees that “language is not the point”; but he quickly points out that  
to object, on this score, to calling sentences true, is a confusion. Where the truth 
predicate has its utility is in just those places where, though still concerned with 
reality, we are impelled by certain technical complications to mention sentences. 
Here the truth predicate serves, as it were, to point through the sentence to reality; it 
serves as a reminder that though sentences are mentioned, reality is still the whole 
point. (Ibid.)  
Although Quine left it unsaid in this paper, it is clear he intends with his argument that 
sentences can be called true, and that there is no need to postulate the existence of 
propositions. The “technical complications” arise from our need to make certain 
generalisations that we cannot make without the use of the truth predicate. The utility of 
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the truth predicate exhibits itself with our ability to generalise sentences such as, ‘Tom is 
mortal or Tom is not mortal’ and ‘Snow is white or snow is not white’. And “we ascend 
to talk of truth and of sentences, saying ‘Every sentence of the form “p or not p” is true’, 
or ‘Every alteration of a sentence with its negation is true’”. (Ibid., 145)  
However, it is not clear in what sense does Quine take “‘Every sentence of the 
form p or not p’ is true” as a generalisation of say, ‘Tom is mortal or Tom is not mortal’. 
The most straightforward representation would be: for all x, Fx or not Fx. But surely this 
is not what Quine meant, since this does not range over sentences, which is his intention. 
Neither can he say the following: for all sentences, s, s or not s, since this formulation 
involves a use/mention confusion and does not make sense. Quine is suggesting that we 
use the truth predicate to make the generalisation that any sentence having the same 
“form” as “Tom is mortal or Tom is not mortal” is true. It would go against Quine’s own 
principles to equate this to the claim that for all p, if a sentence S is of the form “T or not-
T”, then if S expresses the proposition that p, then p. It appears that “‘Every sentence of 
the form p or not p’ is true” is Quine’s way of saying, “For all propositions p, p or not p”. 
If this is what Quine is saying, then he is sneaking in propositions while claiming that his 
disquotational project removes propositions from truth-talk. If so, then Quine’s 
disquotational theory fails by its own terms. Quine does not clearly avoid commitment to 
propositions. This might in turn results to Quine not fulfilling the second desideratum of 
an ideal deflationary theory. However, regardless whether he fails to satisfy this 
desideratum or not, the inability to clearly avoid commitment to propositions falls short 
his own standards for a good theory of truth.  
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Quine claims that in making generalising statements like the above is the reason 
we engage in truth-talk, even though it is still reality that we are talking about when we 
say that a sentence is true. Quine emphasises,  
What prompts this semantic ascent is not that ‘Tom is mortal or Tom is not mortal’ 
is somehow about sentences … We ascend only because of the oblique way in 
which the instances over which we are generalising are related to one another. 
(Ibid.)  
This brings out Quine’s point that semantic ascent of truth-talk in terms of sentences does 
not make truth hinge on language, but relies only the common-sense intuition that reality 
makes sentences true. “The truth predicate is a reminder that, despite the technical need 
to talk of sentences, our eye is on the world”. (Ibid., 146) It should be observed here that 
Quine’s deflationary theory of truth is a case where truth or the truth predicate is not seen 
as redundant, as it was by early deflationary theories.2 The truth predicate has its use. 
Quine elaborates:  
Quotation marks make all the difference between talking about words and talking 
about snow (reality). The quotation is a name of a sentence that contains a name, 
namely, ‘snow’, of snow. By calling the sentence true, we call snow white. The 
truth predicate is a device of disquotation. We may affirm the single sentence by 
just uttering it, unaided by quotation or by the truth predicate; but if we want to 
affirm some infinite lot of sentences that we can demarcate only by talking about 
the sentences, then the truth predicate has its use. We need to restore the effect of 
objective reference when for the sake of some generalisation we have resorted to 
semantic ascent. (Ibid.) 
With this, we arrive at Quine’s disquotational theory. The truth predicate, together with 
the use of quotation marks enables us to make certain generalisations so we can speak 
about reality despite the facade of talking about sentences. When we place a sentence in 
quotation marks followed by the truth predicate, we indicate that we are speaking about 
the contents of the sentence with its reference to reality. When we say that ‘Snow is 
                                                 
2 See Frank Ramsey’s Facts and Propositions and The Nature of Truth.  
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white’ is true, we can remove the quotation marks and the truth predicate and simply say 
that snow is white. So with the truth predicate, we can be sure that we are not talking 
about the sentence, but about the colour of snow. This is Quine’s position on truth: the 
truth predicate has the function of disquotation, and via talk of sentences, we speak of 
non-linguistic reality. Quine’s theory of truth counts as deflationist because it does not 
assume that truth is a property, nor offer necessary and sufficient conditions for 
something’s being true. Instead, it gives an explanation of the linguistic role of the truth 
predicate, with the underlying assumption that if this explanation is complete, it is all we 
need to know and all we can ever discover about the nature of truth. A complete 
understanding of the truth predicate is a complete understanding of truth itself.  
Problems with Quine’s Disquotational Theory 
 Despite convincing observations about how the truth predicate allows for us to 
make certain generalisations, Quine’s analysis of it is incorrect. He may be right that we 
are talking about reality when we say that something is true, but he is wrong to think that 
we are not also talking about language given his analysis of the truth predicate. For 
Quine, “‘Snow is white’ is true” is taken as equivalent to “Snow is white”; we are not 
talking about language or sentences when we say that the sentence is true. The emphasis 
on talk about reality rather than talk of language is misleading. For, it gives the 
impression that Quine is silent about sentences when in fact his analysis makes explicit 
commitment to sentences. According to his analysis, anyone who uses the truth predicate 
is making a statement about sentences over and above talk of extra-linguistic reality. A 
commitment to sentences is not in itself problematic, as we all are committed to 
sentences. However, Quine’s analysis of truth implies that we cannot make a statement 
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using the word “true” without logically committing ourselves to the existence of 
language, and this is incorrect. Quine’s truth schema makes it explicit that sentences are 
the things we call true. Quine takes “‘Snow is white’ is true” as equivalent to “Snow is 
white”, which is plainly false. One says something about a sentence, while the other 
simply says that snow is white. The statement that snow is white is true is false if no 
sentence exists; this statement depends for its truth on the existence of the sentence 
“Snow is white”. By contrast, the statement that snow is white does not depend for its 
truth on the existence of any sentence. Relative to a possible world that contains white 
snow but no language, “‘Snow is white’ is true” is false, but “Snow is white” is true. 
From this, it is evident that “‘Snow is white’ is true” is not equivalent to “Snow is white”. 
In taking them to be equivalent, Quine’s truth schema simply does not achieve the 
equivalence demanded by it, where the left-hand side of the other truth schema stated is 
indeed equivalent to the right-hand side. Hence Quine fails to satisfy the first desideratum 
proposed. 
To make the point sharper, suppose I say: “‘Snow is white’ is true, but there are 
no sentences.” If so, then I have said something necessarily false. It seems obvious that 
there are no possible worlds in which ‘Snow is white’ is true but in which there are no 
sentences, since ‘Snow is white’ itself is a sentence. Suppose then I say simply: “Snow is 
white, but there are no sentences.” If I say this, I do not say something that is necessarily 
false, since there are possible worlds that contain white snow but no sentences. So, even 
if Quine gets away with saying that “‘Snow is white’ is true” is about the world, he does 
not escape saying it is also about language. In his analysis of the truth predicate, Quine 
cannot say that we are not talking about language, for in saying that “‘Snow is white’ is 
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true”, we are making a statement about the sentence ‘Snow is white’, and not merely 
talking about the whiteness of snow.3 As a result, the truth conditions of sentences given 
by Quine are wrong, for they depend not just on how the world is, but also on the 
presupposition that language exists. With this, Quine’s disquotational account of truth is 
demonstrated to be false.  
A related objection to Quine’s disquotational theory is that “Snow is white” does 
not logically entail “‘Snow is white’ is true”, even if there exists a language, for the word 
‘snow’ might refer to grass in this language, so that it is false that ‘Snow is white’ is true. 
Quine himself alludes to this particular difficulty; as he writes in Theory of Reference,  
a given string of letters or sounds could constitute at once a statement say of 
English and a statement (different in meaning, to borrow a phrase) of Frisian, and it 
might happen in its English meaning to be true and in its Frisian meaning to be 
false. (Quine, 1961:135) 
Church notes the same problem in On Carnap's Analysis of Statements of Assertion and 
Belief where he observes that exact words can be replicated “without saying what 
meaning was attached to them”. (Church, 1950) So, we cannot take, say, “Snow is white” 
and “‘Snow is white’ is true” to be equivalent, for “Snow is white” in the second sentence 
might not have the same meaning as the one in the first. Furthermore, he says that in such 
cases, where Quine wants to say that “Snow is white” is equivalent to “‘Snow is white’ is 
true”, the words are intended to be of an English sentence instead of another language in 
which the words “Snow is white” could have a different meaning from the “Snow is 
                                                 
3Quine makes a similar point in On What There Is, where he says that “To see Naples is to bear a name 
which, when prefixed to the words ‘see Naples’, yields a true sentence; still there is nothing linguistic about 
seeing Naples”. Quine is probably right that there is nothing linguistic about seeing Naples, but given his 
analysis of what it means to see Naples, it is not true that there is nothing linguistic about seeing Naples, 
since his analysis depends on there being names and words, specifically ‘sees Naples’. So, Quine makes a 
mistake by saying that on his analysis of seeing Naples, there is nothing linguistic about it, just as he makes 
the same error here saying that we are also not talking about sentences when we say that “‘Snow is white’ 
is true”. (Quine, 1961:16) 
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white” in English. (Ibid.) However, this piece of information is left out, thus leaving open 
a possibility that the two sentences might not be equivalent given that they could be of 
different languages. It will not do to specify the language in which the sentences should 
be understood, such that the truth schema would read “‘Snow is white’ is true” if and 
only if ‘Snow is white’ is an English sentence and snow is white. If snow can be white is 
the absence of language, it can be white in the absence of English. Alternatively, we 
might have to specify further to make the truth schema read more precisely: “‘Snow is 
white’ is true-in-English” if and only if snow is white. But this is not analysis of “true”, 
but merely of an invented predicate, “true-in-English”. 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter, Quine’s disquotational theory is shown to satisfy at most the 
second desideratum but not the first (and more important) one for any satisfactory 
deflationary theory of truth. His claim that making sentences the bearers of truth does not 
make truth hinge on language rather than reality does not work. As I have argued, Quine 
does make truth depend on language such that his theory does not respect the equivalence 
of all the instances of the truth schema. Quine’s disquotational theory is not an ideal 
deflationary theory; it does not fulfil both desiderata set out at the beginning of this 
thesis. It does not cohere with the deflationist agenda. In the next chapter, I will continue 
my discussion on deflationism with an examination of another prominent deflationary 




Horwich’s Minimal Theory of Truth 
Horwich’s minimal theory is not just a different deflationist theory, but it has a 
different take on the bearers of truth as well. Propositions, not sentences, are the truth 
bearers. Having encountered Quine’s theory, which does not require the postulation of 
propositions, it will be interesting to examine a theory of truth that concedes their 
existence. Moreover, given the shortcomings of Quine’s theory, we need another 
deflationary theory that actually provides a correct analysis of all the sentences that use 
the truth predicate. As it turns out, commitment to propositions is the crucial difference 
between the two theories; we shall see that only by conceding the existence of 
propositions does Horwich’s minimal theory overcome the shortcomings of Quine’s 
disquotational theory.  
Horwich’s Minimal Theory of Truth 
Common to deflationary theories, Horwich views his minimal theory as  
a reaction against the natural and widespread idea that the property of truth has 
some sort of underlying nature and that our problem as philosophers is to say what 
that nature is, to analyse truth either conceptually or substantively, to specify, at 
least roughly, the conditions necessary and sufficient for something to be true.  
For Horwich, the deflationist “denies that there is any prospect of an explicit definition or 
reductive analysis of truth, even a very approximate one”. (Ibid., 239) Note that Horwich 
describes truth as a property, “the property of truth”, but this property as we will see later 
is not to be understood in the same sense as the sort that robust theories attribute to truth. 
According to Horwich, deflationism in general accepts all instances of the truth schema: 
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The belief (conjecture, assertion, supposition, …) that p is true iff p. Horwich goes 
further to say that,  
since our commitment to these schemata accounts for everything we do with the 
truth predicate, we can suppose that they implicitly define it. Our brute acceptance 
of their instances constitutes our grasp of the notion of truth. No conceptual 
analysis is called for? no definition of the form ‘true’ means ‘F’ where ‘F’ is some 
expression composed of terms that are more basic than the truth predicate. 
Moreover, there is going to be no non-definitional analysis of truth either, however 
rough and ready? no substantive discovery of the form x’s being true consists in 
x’s having property F. (Ibid., 240) 
Such a position on truth puts Horwich along similar lines with Quine, as they both hold 
that a complete understanding of the truth schema defines truth and that a definition of 
truth as attempted by robust theorists is not forthcoming.  
 Horwich’s theory of truth is minimalistic because it claims that our theory of truth 
should contain no more than the instances of the truth schema. Although Horwich accepts 
the basic tenet of the ‘redundancy theory’ held by Frege and Ramsey? the idea that the 
proposition that p is true means no more and no less than simply p? he thinks this is 
insufficient. It does not say anything much about the function of our concept of truth. The 
minimal theory improves on this aspect by providing an explanation of why we have the 
concept of truth, and it attributes the same role to the truth predicate as Quine did; the 
truth predicate enables us to capture certain generalisations. Aside from this 
improvement, Horwich claims that his minimalistic picture of truth gives an adequate 
account of our concept of truth. He says that we are naturally disposed to accept all 
instances of the truth schema and this disposition governs the overall use of the truth 
predicate. Horwich and Quine thus diverge here: where Quine provides a disquotational 
function to the truth predicate, Horwich simply says that the acceptance of the truth 
schema provides the best explanation of our total linguistic practice with the term. So 
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unlike Quine who attempts to explain how we use the truth predicate by showing how it 
has the generalising function, Horwich claims that this function is fully explained by our 
acceptance of the truth schema. In this way, Horwich’s theory of truth is minimalistic, as 
it simply accepts the truth schema and it propounds no more than this acceptance.  
Is truth a property? 
 Two details of Horwich’s position need to be clarified here in order to compare 
and contrast it with Quine’s disquotational theory. Firstly, Horwich has no qualms in 
claiming that truth is a property, in fact for him, truth is indeed a property, but only of a 
certain kind. Secondly, Horwich holds that the bearers of truth are propositions, and he 
readily accepts the existence of propositions. To the question Is truth a property?, 
Horwich says that  
Minimalism does not involve, in itself, any particular answer to the question. For it 
may be combined with a variety of different conceptions of property, some of 
which will yield the conclusion that the truth predicate does stand for a property, 
and some that it doesn’t. (Horwich, 1990:141)  
He draws a distinction between two conceptions of property, namely, the weak liberal 
conception and the strong ‘robust’ conception. According to the weaker conception,  
every term that functions logically as a predicate stands for a property … Therefore 
the truth predicate must indeed be rendered in logic as a predicate. Thus there is a 
perfectly legitimate, weak conception of property according to which minimalism 
implies that truth certainly is one. (Ibid., 142)  
On the other hand, the stronger conception is:  
a predicate expresses a ‘substantive’ property if and only if there is no a priori 
obstacle to its being reducible to non-semantic terms. Minimalism, in so far as it 
maintains, on the basis of a priori considerations, that truth is not naturalistically 
reducible, will imply that it is not, in that sense, ‘substantive’. (Ibid.)  
With this distinction, Horwich’s minimal theory is definitely deflationist. It denies, or at 
least avoids, exactly what the robust theories assume. Although Quine makes no explicit 
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mention of truth as a property of sentences in his theory and he does not appear to accept 
the existence of properties, he is not very different from Horwich on this matter. If 
“property” were to be taken in the weaker sense, in which a property is basically just a 
predicate, then Quine is likely to accept that truth is a property of sentences, since 
predicates are components of sentences. In this respect, Quine’s position is similar to 
Horwich’s.  
Propositions as truth bearers 
 The second detail of Horwich’s theory will contrast with Quine’s, and this 
concern propositions as the bearers of truth. As we see earlier, Quine argues that if we 
can say that sentences can be true without making truth hinge on the existence or use of 
language, there is no need to claim that propositions are truth bearers in order to make 
sense of truth. Horwich, by contrast, argues that there are such entities as propositions, 
and they are conceptually prior to the concept of truth, and indeed indispensable to 
explain certain central uses of the truth predicate. Horwich regards commitment to 
propositions as inevitable even apart from the role they play in explaining our uses of the 
concept and language of truth. This is mainly because, according to him, we require 
propositions to serve as the contents of propositional attitudes like belief, desire, and 
knowledge:  
On the basis of the inferential behaviour of that-clause (propositional attitude) 
constructions, a good case can be made for concluding that they articulate relations 
(such as believing, asserting, and hoping) between people and whatever are 
designated by the constituent that-clause? i.e. propositions. (Ibid., 129-130) 
Moreover, the contents of a sentence can be uttered in different languages but still 
conveying the same meaning and having the same truth-value. Or the same content can 
be asserted with different sentences in the same language. So it seems there is one thing 
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shared by these different sentences, namely, the proposition asserted, and not the 
sentence itself or the words that constitute it. The following is Horwich’s analysis of 
Oscar’s saying ‘I am hungry’:  
if we agree with Oscar, we attribute truth to what he said, to the proposition he 
asserted. Evidently the sentence-type is used on other occasions to make false 
statements. Nor would one normally characterize the noises he made, or his belief 
state, as true. These entities are more naturally described as ‘expressing a truth’ and 
‘being of a true proposition’. No doubt we do attribute truth to statements, beliefs, 
suppositions, and so on; but surely what we have in mind is that the propositional 
objects of these linguistic and mental acts are true, not the acts themselves. (Ibid., 
16)  
Although Horwich, like Quine, sees the truth predicate as having for its most important 
use the making of certain generalisations, the difference in the two accounts lies in 
Horwich’s readiness to concede the existence of propositions. Like Quine, Horwich holds 
that  
the truth predicate exists solely for the sake of a certain logical need. On occasion 
we wish to adopt some attitude towards a proposition? for example, believing it, 
assuming it for the sake of argument, or desiring that it be the case? but find 
ourselves thwarted by ignorance of what exactly the proposition is. We might know 
it only as ‘what Oscar thinks’ or ‘Einstein’s principle’; perhaps it was expressed, 
but not so clearly or loudly enough, or in a language we don’t understand; or? and 
this is especially common in logical and philosophical contexts? we may wish to 
cover infinitely many propositions (in the course of generalizing) and simply don’t 
have all of them in mind. In such situations the concept of truth is invaluable. For it 
enables the construction of another proposition, intimately related to the one we 
can’t identify, which is perfectly appropriate as the alternative object of our 
attitude. (Ibid., 2-3)  
To avoid giving a wrong analysis of the truth predicate by making truth-talk essentially 
about language, Horwich makes propositions play the role of that language plays in 
Quine’s theory. In this way, he can provide the correct truth conditions of the 
generalisations without the difficulties Quine faces.  
 An example of Horwich’s analysis of the generalising uses:  
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“From ‘What Smith said was true’ and ‘What Smith said was that snow is white’, it 
follows that ‘Snow is white’. Given the minimal theory (MT) this fact can be 
explained as follows: 
1. What Smith said is true. 
2. What Smith said = ‘Snow is white’ 
3. ‘Snow is white’ is true (from 1, 2) 
4. ‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white. (MT) 
5. Snow is white. (from 3, 4)” (Ibid., 21) 
Note that (4) is an axiom of the minimal theory of truth. Some examples of the axioms of 
this theory are “‘Grass is green’ if and only if grass is green” and “‘Oscar is hungry’ if 
and only if Oscar is hungry”. For Horwich, the use of the truth predicate is the solution to 
the difficulty of finding something that could stand in for ‘Snow is white’ when Smith 
says ‘Snow is white’, or an infinite lot of statements that Smith has asserted, which would 
simply be implausible to express without the truth predicate. Truth also supplies us with 
propositions such as “Every proposition of the form: ‘everything is F or not F’ is true”, 
without which we would have the impossible task of asserting “Everything is red or not 
red, and happy or not happy, and cheap or not cheap, … and so on”. (ibid., 4-5)  
Problems with propositions  
As mentioned earlier, Horwich thinks that we should not be sceptical about the 
existence of propositions simply because we are unable to say explicitly what 
propositions are, since we have to posit them for independent reasons anyway. But this 
reason for supposing that propositions are truth bearers is not good enough. How are we 
to understand propositions? Will a definition of propositions be one that presupposes an 
understanding of truth? Insofar as we need propositions for the reasons Horwich gives, 
we can understand propositions say, as sets of possible worlds. But how are we to 
understand possible worlds? Surely a possible world is nothing but a maximal consistent 
set of facts, a set containing all the facts that obtain along with a given fact. If so, then a 
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proposition will presuppose the obtainment of a fact. But “The fact that p obtains” just 
seems like another way of saying “It is true that p”. So, it looks like we cannot grasp 
Horwich’s propositions unless we already grasp truth.  
It is true that not everyone is willing to identify the objects of propositional 
attitudes, or the shared contents of logically equivalent statements, with sets of possible 
worlds. But by any account of such objects or contents, it will be at least sufficient for a 
difference between any two of them that one corresponds to a different set of possibilities 
than the others. For example, the statement that there are animals with hearts differs in 
content from the materially equivalent statement that there are animals with kidneys, 
since there are possible worlds in which there are animals with hearts but not animals 
with kidneys.  
Nor does the objection I am raising to Horwich’s account depend on any 
particular conceptions of possibilities. If we prefer, we can speak of maximally detailed 
self-consistent stories, instead of possible worlds. But here again we can eliminate such 
talk in favour of truth-talk, speaking of sets of each of which comprises all the sentences 
or utterances that can be true at the same time as a given sentence. 
 Propositions are commonly considered mysterious entities, and as Horwich 
himself admits we are unable to say exactly what sort of things propositions are. Many 
philosophers have urged that a theory of truth should not involve such controversial 
entities. This is Quine’s complaint. The deeper reason for dissatisfaction of Horwich’s 
appeal to propositions is that it just takes us out of the frying pan and into the fire. Given 
propositions, we can make do without the word “true”, but equally, given truth, we can 
make do without the word “propositions”, in a theory of truth or any other theoretical 
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context. So, Horwich’s deflationism is not that deflationary after all. It inflates on 
propositions in order to deflate the notion of truth. But such a move does not work since, 
as we have seen, there appears to be an even trade-off between truth and propositions, in 
the sense that (1) committing to truth relieves one of commitment to propositions, and, 
(2) committing to propositions relieves one of commitment to truth. Horwich emphasises 
(2), but if (1) is also true, then it is hard to see what his theory accomplishes.  
These problems are completely avoided by Quine’s disquotational theory, since it 
does not postulate the existence of propositions. Instead, sentences are said to be the 
rightful truth bearers, and it is not difficult to say what sentences are, and anyway we 
obviously have to countenance them for independent reasons. So, in this respect, Quine 
fares better. However, his theory of truth is not free of problems, the most distressing one 
being that it provides an incorrect account of the truth predicate, as argued in the previous 
chapter. 
The Challenge for Deflationism 
All deflationary theories now face the challenge of how to account for our use of 
the concept of truth (and the predicate “true”) in making general statements like 
“Whatever follows from the fundamental theorem of calculus is true” without either (a) 
misconstruing such statements as having to do essentially with language, or (b) 
construing them as statements about entities that we would not have to admit into 
existence if we helped ourselves to a robust notion of truth. Quine chose the first route. 
However, we saw in the previous chapter that this leads to the problem of presenting an 
inaccurate account of truth. Horwich, as we have seen in this chapter, chooses the second 
route, and it has also been shown to be a difficult position to maintain for any 
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deflationary theory. So, deflationary theories must analyse the generalising uses of truth 
without landing themselves into the pitfalls of both Quine’s and Horwich’s theories, and 
this is just to avoid both (a) and (b), the present challenge facing deflationism. I will offer 
an analysis of the generalising uses of truth in the next chapter, bearing in mind this 
challenge for any deflationist attempt. 
Conclusion 
In examining deflationism in detail, we have uncovered two problems facing 
deflationism, one of which Quine escapes at high cost, but Horwich and many other 
deflationists succumb to. Quine’s account of truth is inaccurate, yielding a false analysis 
of truth attributions. Horwich’s theory trades a commitment to robust truth for a 
commitment to something equally undesirable, namely, robust propositions. It is clear 
from the discussion in Chapter Two and Three that the main challenge for deflationism is 
to account for the generalising uses of truth-talk in a way that satisfies the two desiderata. 
An ideal deflationary theory should fulfil these two requirements to avoid the pitfalls of 
Quine’s disquotational theory and Horwich’s minimal theory. In the next chapter we 




An Alternative Deflationary Account 
 In this chapter, I attempt to deal with the problem of propositions discussed in the 
preceding chapter. If Horwich’s minimal theory can be put forth without presupposing 
the existence of robust propositions then we will have an answer to the question, how 
deflationary is deflationism. Deflationism is at least free of the charge that in deflating 
the notion of truth, it inflates the notion of propositions. As we have seen previously, 
there are two requirements to fulfil for any satisfactory deflationary theory of truth. 
Firstly, it must provide a correct analysis of the truth predicate, and secondly, to maintain 
its deflationist attitude it should avoid including possibly robust entities such as 
propositions in the theory. Quine’s disquotational theory fails to satisfy the first and more 
important requirement, but fulfils the second. Horwich, on the other hand, satisfies the 
first, but not the second. As the first requirement more crucially needs to be fulfilled, I 
will see if Horwich’s position is worth defending here by dealing with the problem of 
propositions that his theory is confronted with.  
A different deflationary account 
Recall that Horwich’s analysis of sentences of this sort “The Pope said something 
true” is “There exists a p such that the Pope said that p, and p,” where p is a variable 
ranging over propositions. The problem with this is that it commits one ontologically to 
the existence of propositions. To deal with this problem, I attempt to translate “The Pope 
said something true” in some other way. This translation must, without conceding the 
existence of propositions, ‘eliminate’ the word “true” in typical deflationary fashion. The 
sentence “The Pope said something true” need not be understood only in one of the 
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following two ways: as saying something about sentences, or about propositions. Quine 
advocates the former, Horwich the latter. The difference between Quine or Horwich’s 
account and the account that I will present shortly, is that Quine and Horwich try to 
account for “Pope” statements in terms of what we use them to say, whereas I try to 
account for them in terms of what we use them to do (apart from or in addition to what 
we use them to say).  
Unlike Quine or Horwich, the truth conditions of a statement like “The Pope said 
something true” are not primarily what make the statement useful to us. Primarily, such a 
statement is useful to us as a way of taking on conversational obligations distinct from 
those we take on in making an ordinary generalisation, such as “The Pope ate something 
tasty”. Instead of taking on either of Quine’s or Horwich’s positions and defending it, 
which has repeatedly been shown to be a tough endeavour easily cornered into robust 
commitments, I propose that in making statements like the above, we undertake certain 
conversational and cognitive obligations. The undertaking of such obligations is 
necessary and sufficient for making a truth-claim. To eliminate truth-talk in this way, we 
do not need a formula or a schema that is applicable to all truth-statements; one that all 
such statements neatly fit into. We only need a set of general obligations of which we 
undertake some, but not necessarily all, in making these statements, and show that truth 
statements can be fully understood by reference to this set of general obligations. I will 
also argue that such obligations can be understood without reference to truth or 
propositions robustly construed. In this case, we avoid any unwelcome commitment to 
sentences or propositions in our theory, while providing an accurate analysis of the truth 
predicate, thus we have a truly deflationary account of truth.  
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The simple case 
 I begin with the simplest occurrence of the use of truth. In ordinary speech, when 
either “It is true that snow is white” or “‘Snow is white’ is true” is uttered, the obligations 
undertaken are much the same. This is because the content to be communicated is the 
same, for most practical purposes. In uttering either of these two statements, we intend to 
talk about the real snow that exists in the world, and say that it is white. We are not 
primarily talking about the proposition that snow is white or the sentence “Snow is 
white”. If our subject matter is simply snow, then we need not bother ourselves too much 
with the difference between the two ways of talking about snow’s whiteness. In fact, the 
difference in presentation of the same content points to other intentions, such as the 
manner in which the content is emphasised, and other stylistic differences.  
In using truth, we take on the commitment of maintaining our statement about 
snow being white. When we say, “It is true that snow is white” or “‘Snow is white’ is 
true”, we are committed to maintain it, that is, we are not allowed to hold the contrary 
position. The obligations we take on are much the same, whether we say “Snow is 
white”, “It is true that snow is white” or “‘Snow is white’ is true”. Here I am aware that 
of course they are not exactly the same, since in my discussion of Quine, I argued “Snow 
is white” is not logically equivalent to “‘Snow is white’ is true”. However, what I claim 
here is that the conversational obligations undertaken for all three statements are more or 
less the same despite the fact that these statements are not the same. To elaborate, 
someone who says, “Snow is white” is no less committed to the claim that snow is white 
than someone who says, “It is true that snow is white.” Someone who says “Snow is 
white” fully commits himself to the claim that snow is white, even if he does not make 
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this commitment as emphatically as one would using “true”. Even if “It is true that snow 
is white” is a stronger way of asserting that snow is white than “Snow is white”, these are 
still just two ways of asserting the same thing, i.e., that snow is white. The difference 
between the two statements is at most in how strongly the assertion is made, not how 
strong the asserted content is.  
Two advantages 
Looking at the use of truth in this way has two advantages. Firstly, it is silent on 
propositions, and commitment to sentences in the way Quine makes truth hinge on 
language rather than reality is avoided, as I have said there is no genuine difference with 
regard to conversational obligations between the two ways of making the same assertion. 
Secondly, this analysis of truth (or more accurately, the use of the word ‘true’) remains 
deflationary, which is the objective of this thesis. This analysis of truth says that when we 
use the word ‘true’, it adds no more to the conversational obligations we already 
undertake should we make the same assertion without using the word “true”. The 
predicate ‘is true’ or the prefix ‘It is true that’ does not make truth a robust concept, since 
it adds nothing to the same assertion when made without using ‘true’.  
Returning to the obligations and commitments as mentioned, it should be noted 
that they should in no way be robust, or else this deflationary project fails. Hence I am 
required to further argue for this claim (should my deflationary thesis stand), which is the 
purpose of the rest of this chapter. 
Commitments and obligations 
Before I proceed to further support my case with a discussion of how my position 
applies to truth-talk in universal and existential claims, I offer some suggestions of these 
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so-called obligations and commitments one undertakes when he uses the word “true”. 
There are conversational norms and rules and in order for a proper conversation to be 
carried out; its participants must follow them.4 Suppose in a conversation I say, “It is true 
that the earth revolves around the sun”, and my friend who also partakes in this 
conversation disagrees. The main obligations I undertake here in making an assertion are 
to defend it when challenged and not to make contrary assertions without retracting this 
one. And in this case, my friend disagrees that the earth revolves around the sun, so I 
have to defend my assertion, which is expected of me if this conversation is a sensible 
one. With regard to the discursive commitments it entails, the statement “It is true that the 
earth revolves around the sun” differ not at all from the statement “The earth revolves 
around the sun”. 5  
As for the case of making suppositions, when one says, “Suppose the earth 
revolves around the sun … ”, the commitments undertaken, although the same as “It is 
true that the earth revolves around the sun”, are undertaken only within the scope of this 
supposition. The person who makes or accepts this supposition is not obliged to 
undertake the commitments associated with “It is true that the earth revolves around the 
sun” outside of this supposition. There is a clear difference between making such a 
supposition and saying, “It is true that the earth revolves around the sun”. The person 
who makes an assertion is expected to maintain and defend it on any occasion when his 
assertion is challenged, whereas one who only makes a supposition is committed to 
maintain and defend it only within the context and scope of the supposition. 
                                                 
4 Refer to H.P. Grice’s Logic and Conversation where he argues for conversational implicature and gives 
details of the workings of conversations. (Jackson, 1991:155-75) 
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The case can be similarly applied to situations when one raises a question. When 
one asks, “Does the earth revolve around the sun?” we can expect him to be willing to 
join us in trying to answer it. The questioner will be interested to discover whether the 
earth revolves around the sun, that is, he will be interested in looking at evidence of this 
phenomenon, or contrary evidence. If instead, he is not interested in any such evidence, 
then his question has not been sincere; there would have been no point for him to ask, 
unless he poses the question as part of an examination for children. Normally, we can 
expect the questioner willingly to partake in finding out the answer to the question, and if 
his fellow conversants accept the question (e.g. do not reject it as irrelevant), the same 
interest in finding an answer can be expected of them. We can expect the questioner to 
await replies and be willing (at least in principle) to accept one of the replies to the 
question, and thus undertake the corresponding obligations attached to one of these 
replies.  
Suppose that after some arguments, my friend who previously said, “I don’t think 
that the earth revolves around the sun” now agrees with me and says, “That’s true”. Then 
he too like me has committed himself to defend this claim should someone else challenge 
him. “It’s true” or “That’s true” is here used with reference to some statement earlier 
asserted, and when someone says either of these two, he obliges himself to the 
responsibility of maintaining it, just as the person who had earlier made that assertion. 
With regards to the assertion, the person who says, “It’s true” is no different from the 
person who has said, the earth revolves around the sun. For, they both undertake the same 
obligations to maintain the statement that the earth revolves around the sun and to defend 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 This applies to written work or in thought as well. When I think or write “It is true that … ”, I should 
defend it in the event that I am required to do so, and make no contradictory statements to it either mentally 
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this when challenged. When one says, “It’s true”, it is as though he was the one who had 
said that the earth revolves around the sun. So, in such a situation, both persons undertake 
the same obligations, in order not to violate the rules of the game. However, it should be 
noted that the utterer of “It’s true” or “That’s true” only undertakes a proxy commitment 
to an assertion, the assertion that was made nearer to him, in this case, the earlier 
assertion that the earth revolves around the sun. When one makes this kind of “assertion 
by proxy”, the purpose or utility of doing so is to undertake the same obligations as the 
person who made the assertion without repeating his or her words. I will say more about 
“assertion by proxy” in the discussion of the generalising cases where statements like 
“Everything the Pope says is true” or “The Pope said something true” are made with 
reference to something other than what has been recently or silently asserted.  
From the above discussion, it is clear that the conversational obligations and 
commitments undertaken are different given distinct conversational performances. The 
conversational obligations of merely raising a question are different from those involved 
in making a supposition, or those undertaken by one who makes an assertion. It is not 
difficult to understand these commitments and their workings, as we customarily take 
them on in ordinary speech and thought. These commitments are commonsensical and 
intuitive, not robust or mysterious like propositions.  
The universal case 
With a description of how the concept of truth functions in speech and thought, I 
return to the initial problem of this chapter: how do we analyse “The Pope said something 
true” and “Everything the Pope says is true” in deflationary terms? I shall begin with the 
second statement, where a universal quantifier occurs, before dealing with the existential 
                                                                                                                                                 
or literally in order to carry through a meaningful piece of reasoning. 
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quantifier that occurs in the first statement. When I say that everything the Pope says is 
true, I mean to accept all the commitments that are assigned to everything the Pope has 
said. If the Pope has said that snow is white, I undertake the commitments involved in 
saying ‘Snow is white’. I accept whatever commitments I would undertake if I myself 
were to make every assertion the Pope has made. Recall the idea of “assertion by proxy” 
where one makes an assertion with reference to something that was asserted by someone 
else. The universal case is one of “assertion by proxy” just as “That’s true” and “It’s true” 
are. One who says, “Everything the Pope says is true”, “That’s true” or “It’s true” 
undertakes the same obligations as the other person whose assertions he now agrees with, 
as though he has made these assertions himself.6  
Now consider a scenario where the Pope makes a false assertion and says, “the 
sun revolves around the earth”, then I also undertake whatever commitments I would 
have undertaken if I myself had asserted this. The case of making a false assertion is 
again similar to that of “assertion by proxy”, where in both cases, the person who said, 
“Everything the Pope says is true” and the person who says, “That’s true” give their 
agreement to undertake the same obligations as someone else. So, even if the Pope had 
made a false assertion, having said that everything the Pope says is true, one must still 
agree to undertake the obligations pertaining to that assertion. It appears therefore, that 
regardless whether I know all the statements the Pope has claimed are true or not, I give 
my agreement to undertake all obligations pertaining to everything that the Pope has 
asserted.  
                                                 
6 This is an extension of the prosentential theory of truth advanced by Grover, Belnap and Camp. (Grover 
et. al., 1975: 73-125) The prosentential theory sees the truth predicate as a device for reference to 
prosentences. However, this theory has not been applied to the generalising uses of truth e.g. in universal 
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The existential case 
When “The Pope said something true” is uttered, the utterer is obliged to accept 
the commitments attached to at least one of all the statements the Pope has made. 
Suppose the Pope makes the following three statements, “Snow is white”, “Grass is 
green”, and “God exists”. The utterer only needs to concede that at least one of the above 
three statements is true and oblige himself to undertake at least one set of commitments 
attached to any of the three statements. This means that when he utters “The Pope said 
something true”, he gives his agreement to undertake the commitments of at least one 
statement that the Pope has made. Even if the utterer only knows that the Pope has 
claimed a bunch of statements to be true, without knowing just which statements these 
are, he is still obliged to undertake the commitments borne by the Pope on one of the 
statements. He has committed himself to not shirking the obligations involved in every 
assertion the Pope has made; he cannot carry on as if everything the Pope has said is 
false.  
To put it differently, suppose there is a certain set of assertions the Pope has 
made. Each of these assertions correlates with a certain set of obligations (the obligations 
undertaken by anyone who makes that assertion). What happens when one says, “The 
Pope said something true” is that he commits himself to accepting one of these sets of 
obligations. That is: he commits himself to behaving in a way that is consistent with there 
being at least one set of obligations? it does not matter which one? correlated with the 
Pope’s assertion that he undertakes. What he will not be allowed to do is to refuse to 
undertake any commitments correlating with a statement from this list. If he does so, then 
                                                                                                                                                 
truth-claims. The idea of “assertion by proxy” fits well with this prosentential view on truth, where the use 
of the truth predicate is a device to refer to other assertions. 
 40
he has not followed the rules of conversation governing truth-talk; his utterance of “The 
Pope said something true” was insincere. He was not prepared to undertake any of the 
commitments to which he has given his agreement to undertake a subset, when he uttered 
“The Pope said something true”; he did not keep his end of the deal. When he utters such 
an existential claim, he begins to owe a debt of undertaking some commitments the Pope 
himself undertakes. He clears this debt when the occasion arises for him to maintain and 
defend some statement the Pope has previously made, and he does so accordingly. 
Before I sum up this chapter, I shall note briefly note another case of the 
generalising uses of the truth predicate. When one says, “Every sound argument has a 
true conclusion”, what is done is to undertake the commitments of the conclusion upon 
undertaking the commitments of the argument’s premises. Once I accept that an 
argument is sound, that is, the argument structure is valid and it has no false premises, 
then I will also accept that it has a true conclusion, and this entails no more than that I 
choose also to undertake the commitments of the conclusion. The acceptance of a sound 
argument will automatically mean the undertaking of the commitments of the argument’s 
conclusion.7 It is easy to understand the use of the truth predicate once we view it as a 
device for undertaking certain commitments. This account of the truth predicate can also 
be applied to its other uses in language without much complication. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have given my basic account of the generalising uses of “true”, I 
have analysed truth in terms of cognitive and conversational commitments, where the 
role of truth-language is to help us undertake these commitments. I have argued that these 
commitments are not robust in any sense that might upset the deflationist thesis, as they 
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are commonsensical and intuitive in that they reflect what is going on in our use of 
language when the concept of truth is drawn upon. I elaborated with examples of truth-
talk as it occurs in language. In particular, I discussed in detail the case of truth as it 
occurs in universal and existential truth-claims, which are the most perplexing cases for 
deflationary theories of truth.  
A universal truth-claim demands that the person who makes this universal claim 
undertake all the conversational commitments that he would undertake if he himself were 
to make a certain set of assertions (such as all the Pope’s assertions). One who makes a 
corresponding existential truth-claim is not allowed to refuse to undertake any of the 
commitments correlating to these assertions. He is obliged to undertake the commitments 
of at least one assertion. In bringing to light the commitments we undertake in making 
assertions involving truth, we have an account of truth as a device for the undertaking of 
such commitments.  
Despite covering most of the common occurrences of “true” in language, I am 
still left with the last task of arguing that my account of the uses of “true” is all there is to 
understanding truth, which I will attempt in the next and last chapter of this thesis. I will 
argue that such a deflationary account is adequate; robust theories are not needed for a 
complete understanding of truth. 
                                                                                                                                                 




Objections and Replies 
Having discussed the common occurrences of truth in language, it is now 
necessary for me to argue that our use of the truth predicate is nothing more or less than 
the undertaking of certain cognitive and conversational commitments. The best way to do 
this is to consider objections to my proposal, and respond to them as well as I can. 
Linguistic Objections 
Although the order of this discussion on truth moves from the explaining of truth-
sentences to the undertaking of commitments, I argue that it is in the opposite direction 
that we should understand truth. It is for the undertaking of certain commitments in 
language that our concept of truth has its use, and not because we have the concept of 
truth that we undertake such commitments. Truth consists in the undertaking of such 
commitments; the word “true” is a device for us to undertake these commitments when 
we make certain assertions, such as the generalising ones mentioned in the previous 
chapter. The purpose of making assertions involving truth is to take on these cognitive 
and conversational commitments. Note that this is not an attempt to define truth as “truth 
means/is the undertaking of such-and-such commitments”. Rather, it is in the undertaking 
of these commitments that truth finds a role in language. The undertaking of such 
commitments does not provide necessary and sufficient conditions for truth, however it 
accounts for our concept of truth. To put it differently, the undertaking of commitments is 
prior to truth; hence it explains our concept and use of truth. It is important to note a key 
difference between such an account of truth and other theories of truth, particularly the 
deflationary ones. It provides an explanation of the generalising uses of truth without 
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providing translations or truth-conditional analyses of them. So unlike Horwich’s 
minimal theory, this deflationary account of truth does not attempt to translate truth-
sentences into certain forms or to analyse truth in terms of propositions. Instead, what is 
claimed here is that in explaining our use of a certain class of sentences we can fully 
account for truth.  
A possible objection to my approach is that it is implausible or ad hoc to claim 
that the word “true” works the way my theory says. Just because the problem of truth 
goes away if the word “true” works the way I am suggesting does not mean that it really 
works that way. Unless I can give some good reason why our language should have a 
word that works the way I say “true” works, my opponents are not likely to be convinced.  
The advantage of having a word with the function that I have attributed to “true” 
is that it allows us to undertake commitments that we would not otherwise be able to 
undertake. For example, it is not practical to repeat everything the Pope has said, or, as 
the case may be, everything that one’s conversational partner has said in the past 15 
minutes. If the Pope has only said is that abortion is bad, then perhaps, the truth predicate 
is not as useful or maybe even redundant. If I wish to undertake the same commitments 
as the Pope, I can simply repeat, “Abortion is bad”. It is not necessary for me to say 
either “Everything the Pope says is true” or “The Pope said something true”. However, if 
the Pope has made many assertions, then the truth predicate has a real practical use. It 
becomes feasible for someone to undertake the same commitments as the Pope simply by 
saying, “Everything the Pope says is true” instead of attempting to repeat all the 
assertions the Pope has made. Sometimes in conversations, it is difficult to repeat 
someone else’s assertion because the assertion is to long or cumbersome to repeat, or 
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certain stylistic forms alter the literal meaning of the assertion. So, given these factors, it 
makes sense to say for example, “What you just said is true” if it is one’s intention in this 
utterance to undertake similar commitments. This is where the truth predicate is not 
redundant and actually has a use in language. This feature of the truth predicate is most 
evident when we examine its generalising uses. Recall in Chapter Two and Three that 
Quine and Horwich make the same observation; they agree that role and use of truth lies 
in its generalising uses and it is here that we can account for our notion of truth.  
Embedding Objections 
I shall now apply my theory to a broader spectrum of generalising uses where 
statements such as “Jill thinks that the Pope said something true” and “If everything the 
Pope says is true, then God exists” are asserted. As argued in the previous chapter, when 
an existential truth-claim is made, the main commitment that one undertakes is the 
obligation to maintain and defend at least one assertion when required, and not to shirk 
all commitments entirely. That is, if I say, “The Pope said something true”, I cannot deny 
all of the assertions made by the Pope even if it turns out that none of them were true. I 
have in making such a statement, committed myself to maintain and defend at least one 
of the Pope’s assertions. So, if I say, “Jill thinks that the Pope said something true”, I 
mean to say that I believe that Jill herself is willing to undertake the commitments of 
defending at least one of the Pope’s assertions. Note that the word “thinks” can have 
various senses here. One of this takes “thinks” as analogous to “holds”, “ deems”, 
“claims” or “states”, while another takes it as analogous to “believes it is likely” or 
“suspects”. If taken in the first sense, the analysis of “Jill thinks the Pope said something 
true” will read: Jill herself is willing to undertake the commitments of defending at least 
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one of the Pope’s assertions. The analysis for the second sense will correspondingly read: 
Jill is inclined, albeit not decisively, to undertake the commitments of defending at least 
one of the Pope’s statements.  
The purpose of the above discussion is merely to indicate that my account of truth 
is applicable to uses of truth occurring in the scope of propositional attitude ascriptions. It 
is not meant to hinge on the details of any specific propositional attitude. If I say instead, 
“Jill doubts that the Pope said something true”, then the analysis will read: “Jill is not 
prepared to commit herself to defending at least one of the Pope’s assertions. Of course, 
this does not exclude the possibility that Jill believes that the Pope has or will ever make 
any true assertions, since the use of “Jill doubts that the Pope has said something true” 
could be contextual, specific to some event, such as, Jill shaking her head in response to a 
speech the Pope has just made on television. The words, “something” and “nothing” vary 
in what they cover from one context of application to another, and this has an effect on 
what we commit ourselves to in making a generalisation with the word “true”. Whatever 
the details come to, truth is still about the undertaking of various conversational and 
cognitively commitments.  
The use of truth as it occurs in a conditional statement requires a different 
analysis. Suppose one says “If everything the Pope says is true, then God exists”. This 
seems to imply that the phrase “everything the Pope says is true” has some truth-value, 
and this could be problematic. For, it might require one to argue that the analysis of the 
conditional should be broken into two parts, namely, “everything the Pope says is true” 
and “God exists”, and both are to taken separately. But to do so is not respecting the 
assertion, which is a conditional statement. An accurate analysis of it should explain it in 
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its entirety, as one statement. To assert the “Everything the Pope says is true” and “God 
exists” is not the same as saying “If everything the Pope says is true, then God exists”. 
Nor is the generalising use of the truth predicate as it occurs in a conditional to be 
confused with the use of it as it occurs in making a supposition. “If everything the Pope 
says is true, then God exists” is not the same as saying “Suppose everything the Pope 
says is true, then God exists”. Unlike a conditional, a supposition commits the supposer 
to defending the claim that everything the Pope says is true, as long as the supposition 
remains active. It is also not the same as saying, “Everything the Pope says is true. 
Therefore, God exists”; I can assert a conditional without asserting its antecedent or 
consequent. We must view the conditional as a whole and analyse it as such.  
The generalising use of the truth predicate as it occurs in a conditional is merely a 
device for undertaking commitments. It is an expression of one’s willingness to 
undertake the commitments of one who asserts the consequent should he already commit 
himself to defending the antecedent. If one undertakes the commitment to defend the 
antecedent, then, by making the conditional claim, he has also given his commitment to 
undertake the obligations associated with asserting the consequent. In this way, to assert, 
“If everything the Pope says is true, then God exists” is to issue a promissory note that 
entitles one’s conversational partners to treat you as if you had asserted “God exists” in 
the event that you undertake all of the commitments that the Pope has undertaken in 
making his assertions. When we use a truth-generalisation in a conditional, we thus take 
on a sort of double-commitment: a commitment to undertake a commitment in the event 
that certain commitments arise. A conditional involving the use of the truth predicate 
when taken as a whole is merely a device for undertaking such double or conditional 
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commitments. It is not that “everything the Pope says is true” has some truth-value that 
makes the conditional as a whole meaningful, but because in using a conditional as a 
device for undertaking commitments, the conditional has a use and is thus meaningful. I 
am not denying the “everything the Pope says is true” has some truth-value, but to 
understand the conditional as a whole, we should account for its use in a way that is 
consistent with the view that the role of its antecedent does not require us to assign it a 
truth-value.  
Conclusion 
In short, the analysis of truth in terms of the obligations I have stated coheres with 
a truly deflationary view about truth. The concept of truth is not strictly about knowing 
whether what is claimed to be true actually corresponds to reality, or that it maximises 
utility, or that is consistent with a certain belief system. In fact, we can eliminate the 
word ‘true’ by replacing it with the words we use to undertake certain commitments. This 
further coheres with founding deflationary theories, where the use of truth adds nothing 
to the content asserted. “It is true that snow is white” means no more than that snow is 
white. Our concept of truth is no more than a device for undertaking certain cognitive and 
conversational commitments, which is required when we make certain assertions. Truth 
is about the undertaking of commitments; regardless whether the bearer of these 
commitments knows in exact detail which commitments he has undertaken. This is 
favourable because unlike Quine’s disquotational theory, it provides an accurate analysis 
of truth as it occurs in language, and it is in no way possibly robust like Horwich’s 
minimal theory. Hence it satisfies the two requirements for a truly deflationary theory of 
truth. 
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In this chapter I have also dealt with the generalising uses of the truth predicate as 
it occurs in conditionals and when it used together with an expression of propositional 
attitudes. I have explained both uses in terms of commitments of defending and 
maintaining what is being asserted; it is no different from the generalising uses of the 
truth predicate as it occurs in existential and universal claims. The purpose of doing so is 
to cover more ground in my analysis of truth and to give my theory of truth more 
concrete application. With this, I conclude my discussion on truth and reiterate that truth 
is about undertaking certain cognitively and conversational commitments; these 
commitments sufficiently explain the role and use of the truth predicate as it occurs in 
language and thought.  
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Conclusion 
 In this thesis, I accomplish two objectives. Firstly, I argue that deflationism is the 
correct starting point of all theories of truth. Thereafter, I examine two prominent 
deflationary theories of truth. Secondly, I offer my own deflationary account of truth, 
explaining the role of the truth predicate in language and its uses in generalising cases. In 
Chapter One, I argue that the discourse on truth calls for a different kind of definition 
for truth, namely, to define truth as explaining its linguistic role, which does not require 
the postulation of truth as a property, the specification of the conditions for truth, and the 
means to determine the satisfaction of these conditions. The robust approach is rejected 
because robust theories are simply not entitled to assume that truth is a property. Given 
the notorious difficulties with treating truth this way, and the economical character of the 
deflationist approach, I choose the deflationist route to understand truth.  
 In Chapter Two, two desiderata for any satisfactory deflationary theory of truth 
is put forth, and Quine’s disquotational theory is shown to satisfy at most the second 
desideratum but not the first (and more important) one. His claim that making sentences 
the bearers of truth does not make truth hinge on language rather than reality does not 
work. I argue that Quine does make truth depend on language such that his theory does 
not respect the equivalence of all the instances of the truth schema. Quine’s 
disquotational theory is not an ideal deflationary theory; it does not fulfil the two 
desiderata; it does not cohere with the deflationist agenda. 
In examining Horwich’s Minimal theory of truth in Chapter Three, two 
problems facing deflationism are uncovered. Quine escapes one of them at high cost, but 
Horwich and many other deflationists succumb to. Quine’s account of truth is inaccurate, 
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yielding a false analysis of truth attributions, while Horwich’s theory trades a 
commitment to robust truth for a commitment to something equally undesirable, namely, 
robust propositions. It is clear from the discussion in Chapter Two and Three that the 
main challenge for deflationism is to account for the generalising uses of truth-talk in a 
way that satisfies the two desiderata. An ideal deflationary theory should fulfil these two 
requirements to avoid the pitfalls of Quine’s disquotational theory and Horwich’s 
minimal theory. 
In Chapter Four, I give my basic account of the generalising uses of “true”, I 
analyse truth in terms of cognitive and conversational commitments, where the role of 
truth-language is to help us undertake these commitments. I argue that these 
commitments are not robust in any sense that might upset the deflationist thesis, as they 
are commonsensical and intuitive in that they reflect what is going on in our use of 
language when the concept of truth is drawn upon. I elaborate with examples of truth-talk 
as it occurs in language. In particular, I discuss in detail the case of truth as it occurs in 
universal and existential truth-claims, which are the most perplexing cases for 
deflationary theories of truth.  
A universal truth-claim demands that the person who makes this universal claim 
undertake all the conversational commitments that he would undertake if he himself were 
to make a certain set of assertions (such as all the Pope’s assertions). One who makes a 
corresponding existential truth-claim is not allowed to refuse to undertake any of the 
commitments correlating to these assertions. He is obliged to undertake the commitments 
of at least one assertion. In bringing to light the commitments we undertake in making 
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assertions involving truth, we have an account of truth as a device for the undertaking of 
such commitments.  
In Chapter Five, I argue that the analysis of truth in terms of the obligations I 
claim coheres with a truly deflationary view about truth. The concept of truth is not 
strictly about knowing whether what is claimed to be true actually corresponds to reality, 
or that it maximises utility, or that is consistent with a certain belief system. In fact, we 
can eliminate the word ‘true’ by replacing it with the words we use to undertake certain 
commitments. This further coheres with founding deflationary theories, where the use of 
truth adds nothing to the content asserted. “It is true that snow is white” means no more 
than that snow is white. Our concept of truth is no more than a device for undertaking 
certain cognitive and conversational commitments, which is required when we make 
certain assertions. Truth is about the undertaking of commitments; regardless whether the 
bearer of these commitments knows in exact detail which commitments he has 
undertaken. This is favourable because unlike Quine’s disquotational theory, it provides 
an accurate analysis of truth as it occurs in language, and it is in no way possibly robust 
like Horwich’s minimal theory. Hence it satisfies the two requirements for a truly 
deflationary theory of truth. I also deal with the generalising uses of the truth predicate as 
it occurs in conditionals and when it used together with an expression of propositional 
attitudes. I explain both uses in terms of commitments of defending and maintaining what 
is being asserted; it is no different from the generalising uses of the truth predicate as it 
occurs in existential and universal claims. The purpose of doing so is to cover more 
ground in my analysis of truth and to give my theory of truth more concrete application. 
With this, I conclude my discussion on truth and reiterate that truth is about undertaking 
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certain cognitively and conversational commitments; these commitments sufficiently 
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